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We investigate a social system of agents faced with a binary choice. We assume there is a correct,
or beneficial, outcome of this choice. Furthermore, we assume agents are influenced by others in
making their decision, and that the agents can obtain information that may guide them towards
making a correct decision. The dynamic model we propose is of nonequilibrium type, converging
to a final decision. We run it on random graphs and scale-free networks. On random graphs, we
find two distinct regions in terms of the finalizing time—the time until all agents have finalized
their decisions. On scale-free networks on the other hand, there does not seem to be any such
distinct scaling regions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Designing simple, mechanistic models of social phe-
nomena has been an off-the-mainstream theme in eco-
nomics and sociology literature for several decades (1).
Such models turn out to be very apt for the methods of
statistical physics. So as the statistical physics commu-
nity gets increasingly interdisciplinary it is not surprising
that there is a growing interest in “sociophysics.” One
of the most common topics in this area is the spread of
opinions (2; 3; 4; 5) or fads (6; 7). In models of these
phenomena, the agents do not usually actively use in-
formation to optimize their behavior; the spread takes
place more or less like an infection process. Another ex-
ample of social systems studied by physicists is spatial,
or networked, games (see Refs. (8; 9; 10) and references
therein). In that case the agents actively try to maxi-
mize their individual gain. Between these two extremes
is the problem of the present paper—collective decision
making (11; 12). This is the situation when a popu-
lation, through individual action and social interaction,
has to make up their mind about a specific question.
This problem differs from the opinion dynamics in that
an individual can do better or worse. It also differs from
evolutionary games in that there is no conflict built into
the problem—the success of one agent is never the harm
of others, or vice versa.
In this paper we model collective decisions as one at the
same time social and individual process. The basic idea
is that the process for an individual to make a decision
contain elements of both social influence and individu-
ally obtained information. This is, since Janis’s concept
of “groupthink” (13), a well-established idea in psychol-
ogy. Our model is a non-equilibrium, agent-based model
for how N individuals each settle for one of two choices.
This dynamic model is grounded on two precepts: First,
the information that an agent bases its decision on is a
sum of contributions from its social neighbors and direct
information sources. Second, when the information in fa-
vor of one decision exceeds a certain threshold, the agent
finalizes the decision. Furthermore, we assume the un-
derlying network to be static. To study the effect of the
network topology on the dynamics, we run it on different
network models.
In the rest of the paper, we will first give a derivation
and a detailed description of the dynamic model and the
models to generate the underlying networks. Then we
present our simulation results and finally relate them to
psychosocial phenomena.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Definition of the model
We restrict ourselves to a binary decision process—a
process where the outcome of the decision can be good
or bad, right or wrong, correct or false. Without loss
of generality, we let +1 represent the “correct” outcome.
Consider a population of N agents connected via an un-
derlying, static, social network. The social network is
represented by a graphG consisting of N vertices, V ; and
M edges, E. The accumulated information used by an
agent i at time t of the decision making process is repre-
sented by St(i). The initial value S0(i), representing the
direct information, is picked randomly. The probability
of S0(i) = +1 is p, otherwise S0(i) takes the value −1.
The social information-spreading process updates
agents iteratively until all agents have reached fixed
states. The current choice of an agent i is sgn (St(i))
2where
sgn (x) =


−1 if x < 0
0 if x = 0
1 if x > 0
. (1)
In our simulations sgn(St(i)) = 0 represents the rare sit-
uation the agent i is completely undecided at time t. If
the information in favor of a particular decision is strong
enough, i.e. |St(i)| > θ for a threshold θ, the agent will
finalize his/her decision, and St(i) remain fix for the rest
of the run. The threshold θ is for simplicity considered
to be the same for every agent. A higher θ implies that
the system needs more time to converge to its decision.
The information exchange between two agents works as
follows: Pick an active (not finalized) agent i at random,
and a random neighbor j of i and let
St+1(i) = St(i) + sgn St(j). (2)
To summarize the algorithm:
1. Pick p and θ.
2. Assign each S0(1), · · · , S0(N); 1 with probability p,
and −1 otherwise.
3. Pick a random active vertex i and a random of i’s
neighbors j.
(a) Let St+1(i) = St(i) + sgn St(j).
(b) If |St+1(i)| > θ, let agent i be finalized.
4. If there are unfinalized vertices, go to step 3.
Our model thus have two control parameters, p and θ.
B. The model: considerations and possible extensions
In a real situation the direct knowledge may be ob-
tained any time during a group prediction process. We
believe this does not change the qualitative behavior of
the model much. Assuming the direct information is to
the benefit of the agent, the sensible range of p is [1/2, 1].
If p = 1/2 the initial knowledge does not guide agents to-
wards a correct decision at all; if p = 1 the knowledge or
preference influences the final decision strongly.
One also has to consider the relative influence of the
agents in the social network. As mentioned, in our model,
one vertex i and a random neighbor of i’s is selected for
the information transfer. This means that, if the network
has neutral degree-degree correlations, then the proba-
bility that information is obtained from a vertex with
degree k is proportional to k. I.e., vertices with many
connections are more likely to influence others than ver-
tices with few connections. This we believe is a plausible
situation: People with many social ties are more likely to
function as opinion-makers.
C. Network models
The model we present can be applied to any under-
lying network. In this paper we will use three types of
model networks: The first model is random graphs (14)
constructed such that M edges are iteratively added be-
tween random pairs of vertices such that no multiple edge
or loop (self-edge) occurs. Such graphs have a bino-
mial degree distribution (which becomes Poissonian in
the N →∞ limit) and no other network structure. Thus
random graphs make a good starting point for investi-
gating a dynamic model such as ours.
Since many real-world networks have skewed degree
distributions we also use a model producing networks
with a power-law degree distribution. These networks,
that we will refer to as “scale-free networks,” are con-
structed by first assigning desired degrees k˜i from a
power-law distribution Prob(k) ∼ k−γ . Then we assign
edges to random pairs (i, j) of vertices as long as the de-
gree of a vertex i is less than k˜i. If (i, j) already is an
edge, or i = j we do not add an edge. This process is
terminated when M edges are added.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Success rate of the decision process
Let φ be the fraction of the population making the
correct decision after the dynamics has converged:
φ =
1
2
+
1
2N
N∑
i=1
sgn S∞(i). (3)
We note that there are two types of qualitatively different
behavior that can emerge. Either the system benefit from
the social communication or it does not. To study this
behavior we define the order parameter
ψ =
φ− p
1− p
, (4)
i.e., the improvement of the decisions from the communi-
cation relative to the theoretically largest improvement.
If no improvement of the decisions are made then ψ = 0.
If all agents decisions are correct (i.e. the improvement
is maximal) ψ = 1.
By construction p = 0.5 is the symmetry value for
which ψ = 0. This means that as p is increased from p =
0.5, systems will on average benefit from the information
diffusion.
In Fig. 1(a) we display ψ, for random networks. We see
that the decisions improve with, not only p, but also θ.
With a higher decision threshold the agents need more
information, and thus more iterations to converge. As
more information is integrated, the average agent can
reach the correct decision with higher probability. How-
ever, there is also a possibility that a majority (or, in-
deed, any fraction) of the agents end up with the wrong
decision.
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FIG. 1 Average relative increased performance ψ as a func-
tion of information quality p for (a) random graphs with dif-
ferent θ-values, usingN = 1000 and 〈k〉 = 5, and (b) scale-free
networks with N = 1000, 〈k〉 = 5 and γ = 2.2. The standard
deviaton σφ of the success rate φ for (c) random graphs and
(d) scale-free networks. The average relative increased per-
formance ψ, (e) as function of average connectivity 〈k〉 for
random graphs with N = 1000 and θ = 40, and (f) as a func-
tion of system size N for random graphs with 〈k〉 = 5 and
θ = 40. Panel (g) shows the average relative increased per-
formance ψ as a function of eccentricity for random graphs
with N = 2000, 〈k〉 = 5 and p = 0.53. (h) displays ψ as
a function of degree for scale-free networks with N = 4000,
〈k〉 = 5, γ = 2.2 and p = 0.53. The curves are logarithmically
binned. Lines are guides for the eyes. All standard errors are
smaller than the symbols.
In Fig. 1(b) we display ψ, for scale-free networks. We
see that, as with the random networks, decisions improve
with both p and θ. Compared with random networks,
the decisions for scale-free networks improve less, on av-
erage, from communication. Qualitatively however, the
improvement from communication is similar to the case
of random networks.
We note that the fluctuations of the success rate φ
is larger for scale-free than random networks as can be
seen from 1(c) and (d). These fluctuation, probably aris-
ing from the larger fluctuations in degree, is a possible
cause for the comparatively low ψ-values of the scale-free
networks (since, occasionally large hubs will initially be
assigned S = −1 and influence its many neighbors to-
wards an incorrect decision).
In Fig. 1(e) we display ψ(p) for different average de-
grees 〈k〉 in random graphs. We see that ψ increases for
with increasing k, that is, systems of agents with less re-
stricted communication patterns will improve more from
communications.
In Fig. 1(f) we display ψ(p) for different system sizes.
As we can see, not much of a difference appears with dif-
ferent system size. At most a smaller deviation is visible
closer to the p values for which ψ approaches 1.
How does the position of a vertex in the network af-
fect its ability to make correct decisions? To investigate
this, we plot the average success of vertices as a func-
tion of their eccentricity (the maximal distance to any
other vertex in the network) in Fig. 1(g) (for the random
network model). A central (low eccentricity) vertex has
a higher probability of making a correct decision than
a more eccentric vertex. Since centrality measures are
usually strongly correlated (15) this suggests that being
central in the information flow, in general, is beneficial
for the individual vertex. Furthermore, in Fig. 1(h) we
plot ψ versus degree in a scale-free network. As degree
can be regarded as a local centrality measure it is no
surprise that these curves reveal a positive correlation.
B. Dynamic properties of the decision making
Being a non equilibrium model, a natural quantity to
study is the average time for systems to reach the fixed
state (where all have finalized their decisions). We call it
the finalizing time τ . To obtain an intensive time scale
(i.e. independent of the system size N), we let t = t′/N ,
where t′ is the simulation time for the system. Since
an agent has to update S at least θ times to finalize its
decision, we see that τ cannot scale slower than linearly
with θ, that is if τ ∼ θz , we in all situations (all p) have
z ≥ 1. In Fig. 2(a) we display θ−1τ for random graphs
as underlying topology. We observe a crossing point at p
close to p∗ = 0.56, below which θ−1τ is increasing with θ
and for larger p, θ−1τ is decreasing with θ. Since z ≥ 1
for all p we should, in the limit of large θ, have z = 1
for p > p∗. From Fig. 2(b) we observe for p < p∗, and
for large θ, that θ−1τ seems to scale linearly with θ. In
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FIG. 2 Scaling analysis of τ in random graphs, where (a) is
a crossing plot used to determine p∗ = 0.559 ± 0.001. The
θ-values in (a) are, from top to bottom in the left side of the
figure (or bottom to top in the right side): 160, 80, 40, 20,
and 10 (as indicated by the legend in panel (c)). (b) shows
τ ’s θ-scaling. Straight lines are fitted to the data points. (c)
displays a scaling-collapse plot verifying F (x)’s asymptotic
behavior using θ = 320, 160, 80 and 40. For all networks
N = 4000 and 〈k〉 = 5. Standard errors are smaller than
symbol sizes.
other words, for large θ and p < p∗, τ is proportional to
θ2. To connect the different behaviors above and below
p∗, we assume a scaling function of the form
τ = θ F
(
θ|p− p∗|νsgn(p− p∗))
)
. (5)
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FIG. 3 The scaling of the finalization time for scale-free net-
works. In this figure, N = 4000, 〈k〉 = 5 and γ = 2.2.
More specifically, to validate our scaling assumption
F (X) must be constant in the limit X → ∞ (to verify
τ ∼ θ above p∗), and F (X) ∼ X in the limit X → −∞
(to verify τ ∼ θ2 below p∗). In Fig. 2(c) we display a
collapse to verify the scaling relation. The collapse is in
agreement with our anticipated scaling behavior and thus
demonstrates the asymptotic behavior of F (X). To sum-
marize, we have two distinct dynamical regions τ ∼ θz
with the critical indices z = 1 and z = 2 that gives the
following asymptotic scaling properties of the finalizing
time for the system:
τ ∼
{
θ if p ≥ p∗
θ2 if p < p∗
. (6)
In Fig. 3 we investigate the θ-dependence of τ for scale-
free networks. Besides the trivial point at p = 1, we
do not observe any crossing point of τ . This suggests
that we do not have two distinct scaling regions for scale-
free networks, rather z seems to be continuously varying,
z = z(p), with 1 = z(1) < z(p < 1) ≤ p(1/2) ≈ 1.4.
In comparison with random graphs the scaling of τ for
scale-free networks is faster for p < p∗ but, in the large-θ
limit, slower for p > p∗.
To get a closer view of the time evolution, we plot (in
Fig. 4(a)) the average number of finalized agents, ηf , as
function of time. We choose three p-values (0.53, 0.56
and 0.59)—over, at, and below the transition between
the scaling regimes for random graphs. We plot the cor-
responding curves for scale-free networks in Fig. 4(b).
The curves for p = 0.53, 0.56 and p = 0.59 are simi-
lar, as can be expected from Fig. 3. The initial increase
of ηf is as fast for the curve of the scale-free networks
as for the p = 0.59-curve of random networks, but the
approach to ηf = 1 at later times slows down consider-
ably. Thus, even if the time a whole population reaches
finalization faster for random networks, the time an in-
termediate fraction of the population have finalized their
decisions may be faster for the SF-networks.
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FIG. 4 The fraction of finalized vertices ηf over time in (a)
random graphs, N = 8000, and (b) scale-free networks with
N = 4000 and γ = 2.2. In all runs we have 〈k〉 = 5 and
θ = 80. Lines are guides for the eyes. Standard errors are
smaller than symbol sizes.
IV. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
We have proposed a dynamic model for collective de-
cision processes. A decision is a choice of one of two
values—the “correct” value +1 and the “incorrect” −1.
We assume an individual’s decision is affected by both
directly obtained information (with some degree of help-
ful content) and information from social neighbors over
social networks. We find that the community will benefit
from social interaction whenever directly obtained infor-
mation is the least helpful. We also observe that systems
of agents with less restricted communication patterns
will improve more from sharing information. Different
global network topologies do not affect the decision abil-
ity quantitatively very much. In other studies, dynamical
network systems—like spatial games (9; 10; 17), disease
spreading (18; 19), congestion sensitive transport (20),
and so on—are highly sensitive to the structure of the
underlying networks. The local network structure makes
a quantitative difference between the agents. An agent
that is central in the information flow has a significantly
higher chance of making the correct decision, than more
peripheral agents.
Generally speaking, the population reach, on average,
a decision that is more likely to be correct than a ran-
dom guess. There might however be clusters of incor-
rect predictions, occasionally spanning a large fraction of
the population. In psychology this result, that collective
predictions may be irrational, has traditionally been ex-
plained by the “groupthink” concept of Irving Janis (13).
In Janis’s work the driving force is that the members of
a tight-knit group try to conform to, what they believe,
is the group’s consensus, this creates an unstable situa-
tion that may lead to an illogical conclusion. (For mod-
ern works see Refs. (11; 21; 22) and further references
therein.) In our model, in contrast, the agents do not ac-
tively try to avoid behaving aberrant; furthermore, the
underlying network need not be a fully connected net-
work; yet sometimes the majority of the population may
predict falsely. In networks with broader degree distri-
butions this tendency is stronger—the large fluctuation,
gives large fluctuations in influence of the vertices and
obscures the system’s ability to integrate the information
of a large fraction of the agents. To epitomize, the dy-
namics of social information diffusion may, in rare cases,
be enough to misguide a population and this is another
process that may lead to the same result as groupthink.
When we run our model on random graphs we find
two distinct dynamic regions of the convergence of the
finalizing time, τ ∼ θz, with the critical indices z = 1
(p > p∗) and z = 2 (p < p∗). In contrast, for scale-free
networks we find no distinct dynamic regions and the
scaling is slower than τ ∼ θ for all values p < 1. In other
words, if the average initial knowledge is high enough
(p > p∗), the decision process on random graphs reach
collective decisions faster than on scale-free graphs. If,
on the other hand, the average knowledge is low (p < p∗)
the decision making is faster on scale-free networks. We
have investigated the limit θ → ∞ for parameter values
such that the average distances d in the network is signif-
icantly less than θ. This means that all the vertices of the
network, in principle, can influence all other vertices. A
potentially different case, which we leave for future stud-
ies, is if θ ≪ d as N grows. Since, in almost any random
network, d(N) is a very slowly growing function (loga-
rithmic or, in the case of SF networks, slower still), it
seems reasonable to assume that natural systems belong
to the case we study.
Finally we note that there is a potential application
of collective decision models to computer science. In the
theory of distributed computing the Byzantine agreement
problem is to coordinate concurrent processes where a
number of the processes are faulty (23; 24). In our con-
text that would be to make all vertices converge to the
+1-prediction. We will not go into details about algo-
rithms to solve the Byzantine agreement problem, but
note that there is an area in common for mechanistic
models of social processes and algorithmic computer sci-
ence. Also algorithms for inference problems, such as
belief propagation (25) or models of associative mem-
ory (26) have partly common ground with decision mak-
ing models such as ours.
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